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OCCUPATIONAL INEQUALITYt
DEBORAH L. RHODE*
For economists in the 1970s, Leviticus 27:3 was a familiar text. Its
teaching, as reported in innumerable scholarly and popular articles, was
that women of working age in Biblical times were valued at thirty silver
shekels and men at fifty. After 2000 years, that ratio had not fundamen-
tally changed. The difference, however, was that for the first time, many
societies were actively attempting to do something about it. By the end
of the 1980s, progress was apparent.
That progress has reflected an interplay of cultural and legal forces.
Over the last quarter century, changes in social, economic, political, and
demographic patterns have all contributed to major transformations in
gender roles. Law has both reflected and reinforced these changes. Since
the early 1960s, American decisionmakers have announced a broad array
of legislative, administrative, and judicial mandates against sex-based dis-
crimination. The result has been a large measure of equality in formal
treatment of the sexes, but a continued disparity in their actual status.
Law has played a critical role in breaking barriers to entry for those seek-
ing non-traditional employment, but most occupations have remained
highly gender-segregated or gender-stratified. While legal mandates have
entitled men and women to equal pay for the same work, relatively few
males and females have in fact performed the same work. If paid labor
and unpaid domestic labor are combined, the average woman works
longer hours and receives substantially less income than the average
man. Although women have entered elite professions in substantial
numbers, they have tended to cluster at the lowest levels. Most female
employees, and a disproportionate number of minority female workers,
have remained in relatively low-status, low-paying, female-dominated
vocations.
Explanations for the lack of progress have varied, but close analysis
reveals fundamental limitations in conventional legal responses. The fol-
lowing discussion explores those limitations in cultural context. It begins
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with a brief overview of occupational inequality and the most commonly
accepted strategy for coping with it, a requirement of equal opportunities
and equal treatment. Although that strategy has been highly important
in raising the costs and consciousness of sex-based discrimination, too
little attention has focused on its underlying foundations.
In part, the difficulty stems from the law's traditional focus on gen-
der differences rather than gender disadvantage. Its primary objective
has been to secure similar treatment for those similarly situated; less ef-
fort has centered on remedying the structural factors that contribute to
women's dissimilar and disadvantaged status. A related difficulty in-
volves the individualist premises that have restricted legal policies. All
too often, a focus on maximizing individual choices has deflected atten-
tion from the social forces and workplace values that constrain such
choices. Enforcement of equal opportunity, pay equity, and affirmative
action mandates has been hampered by a preoccupation with individual
victims and villains, a demand for evidence of intentional discrimination,
and a reluctance to penalize innocent third parties. Too much concern
has focused on the conscious motivations of decisionmakers and too little
on the cumulative disadvantages that their actions impose.
Significant progress toward social justice will require alternative
frameworks. Our objectives must include not only access to, but altera-
tion of existing employment and compensation structures. Equal oppor-
tunity is inadequate as a means and as an end; we need fundamental
changes in workplace premises, priorities, and practices.
I. PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY
A. Statistical Background.
Over the last quarter century, women's employment opportunities
have increased substantially. Women now constitute forty-five percent of
the labor force. ' Progress has been accelerated by the enactment of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits sex-based discrimination in
wages; title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sex-based
discrimination in hiring, advancement, termination, training, and related
terms of employment; and Executive Order 11,375, which requires fed-
eral contractors to establish affirmative action programs for women.2
Despite such enactments and the broader cultural transformation
they reflect, wide disparities in the sexes' vocational status have persisted.
1. V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 12 (1988).
2. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970).
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In 1955, the annual wages of full-time women workers were approxi-
mately sixty-four percent of the annual wages of males.3 Over the next
several decades, that percentage declined, dipping to fifty-eight percent in
1968, and then climbed back to current levels of sixty-four percent (sev-
enty percent, if expressed in terms of weekly wages). 4 However, those
ratios understate overall gender disparities in earnings, since less than
half of all employed women work full-time for the full year, and dispro-
portionate numbers lack employment-related benefits such as health and
pension coverage.5 Even among full-time workers, the average female
college graduate still earns less than the average white male with a high-
school degree. 6 The average black female college graduate in a full-time
position receives ninety-six percent of the average white female college
graduate's salary, a figure roughly equivalent to the pay of a white male
high-school dropout. 7 Women also experience disproportionate levels of
involuntary part-time work and unemployment, with levels particularly
high among minorities.8
These salary and employment disparities reflect broader patterns of
occupational segregation and stratification. Most women employees are
crowded into a small number of existing job categories, and about three-
fifths are in occupations that are at least seventy-five percent female.9
Even in gender-integrated occupations, men and women generally hold
different positions and receive different pay and promotion opportuni-
ties.10 Most jobs still tend to be stratified by race and ethnicity as well as
3. NATIONAL COMM'N ON PAY EQUITY, BRIEFING PAPER ON THE WAGE GAP 2 (1987).
4. Id.
5. S. KAMERMAN & A. KAHN, THE RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE: EMPLOYERS AND A CHANG-
ING LABOR FORCE 60-62 (1987); Pearce, On the Edge: Marginal Women Workers and Employment
Policy, in INGREDIENTS FOR WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT POLICY 197, 200 (C. Bose & G. Spitze eds.
1987) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT POLICY]; see Christopherson, Labor Flexibility: Implications for
Women Workers, in WOMEN AT WORK 3, 10 (R. Schwartz ed. 1988) (two-thirds of all temporary
workers are women); THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1987-88, at 27 (S. Rix ed. 1987).
6. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES P-23, No. 146, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 31 (1986); J. Malveaux, No Images
(1988) (unpublished manuscript; copy on file in offices of Duke Law Journal).
7. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 31.
8. See Malveaux, An Economic Perspective on Difference and Commonality Among Women, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (D. Rhode ed., forthcoming, 1990) [herein-
after THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES]; Pearce, On the Edge: Marginal Women Workers and Employ-
ment Policy, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 198-200.
9. See Hartmann, Roos & Trieman, An Agenda for Basic Research on Comparable Worth, in
COMPARABLE WORTH: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 3, 3-4 (H. Hartmann ed. 1985) [herein-
after NEW DIRECTIONS] (discussing job segregation by sex and gap in pay between men and
women).
10. See S. BIANCHI & D. SPAIN, AMERICAN WOMEN IN TRANSITION 180-88 (1986); Bielby &
Baron, A Woman's Place Is With Other Women: Sex Segregation Within Organizations, in SEX
SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES 27, 43-46 (B. Reskin ed.
1984) [hereinafter SEX SEGREGATION].
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by sex, and women of color remain at the bottom of the occupational
hierarchy."I
Despite significant trends toward greater gender-integration, projec-
tions suggest that at current rates of change, it could take between sev-
enty-five and one hundred years to achieve a sexually balanced
workplace.1 2 The most dramatic progress to date has been in formerly
male-dominated professions such as law, medicine, and management:
women's representation, which ranged between three to seven percent in
the early 1960s, increased to levels of thirty or forty percent by the late
1980s.13 However, at the highest levels of professional status and finan-
cial achievement, significant disparities have remained. For example, in
the late 1980s, females were still only half as likely as males to be part-
ners in law firms, held only eight percent of state and federal judgeships,
and occupied only two percent of corporate executive positions in For-
tune 500 companies.14 Underrepresentation of women of color was sig-
nificantly greater at all professional levels. 15
Gains in blue-collar employment have been even less pronounced.
Although the absolute number of women in such occupations has in-
creased significantly since the 1970s, their proportionate representation
11. See NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, PAY EQUITY: AN ISSUE OF RACE, ETHNICITY
and Sex 14, 20-37, 62 (1987); Malveaux, Comparable Worth and Its Impact on Black Women, in
SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: THE STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN 51, 53-54 (M. Simms & J.
Malveaux eds. 1986) [hereinafter SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS]; Malveaux, An Economic Per-
spective on Difference and Commonality Among Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 8.
12. 2 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80'S
109 (1984) [hereinafter COMPARABLE WORTH] (statement of Joy Ann Grune).
13. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR STATISTICS, EARNINGS AND WAGES 179
(1987); see also Menkel-Meadoe, Feminization of the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of
Women Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES (R. Abel & R. Lewis eds.,
forthcoming, 1989) (chronicling women's increasing representation in the legal profession).
14. A. MORRISON, R. WHITE & E. VAN VELSOR, BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING 5-6 (1987);
Schafran, Women in the Courts Today: How Much Has Changed, 6 LAW & INEQUALITY 27, 29
(1988); Winter, Survey: Women Lawyers Work Harder, Are Paid Less, but They're Happy, 69
A.B.A. J. 1384, 1385 (1983); see Fossum, A Reflection on Portia, 69 A.B.A. J. 1389, 1391-93 (1983);
Slater & Glazer, Prescriptions for Professional Survival, DAEDELUS, Fall 1987, at 119, 132; J.
Malveaux, supra note 6; see also Berg, The Big Eight: Still a Male Bastion, N.Y. Times, July 12,
1988, at DI, col. 3 (only 6.5% of partners at largest law and consulting firms are women); Loden, A
Machismo That Drives Women Out, N.Y. Timles, Feb. 9, 1986, § F, at 2, col. 3; McCarthy, Women's
Salaries Reflect Disparities in Executive Suites, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 37, col. 1; Women Law-
yers Get Less Pay, Respect, Survey Says, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1988, at 18, col. 2 (women in law are
lower-paid, less satisfied with jobs); sources cited infra note 65 (collegial bias in professional and
business contexts).
15. See B. VETTER & E. BABCO, PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND MINORITIES 90-93 tbl. 4-7 (7th
ed. 1987) (reporting 1986 annual average numbers of employed persons by detailed occupation, sex,
race, and Hispanic origin); see also A. SIMEONE, ACADEMIC WOMEN 29-31 (1987) (discussing mi-
nority women within faculty ranks). See generally J. FERNANDEZ, RACISM AND SEXISM IN CORPO-
RATE LIFE (1981).
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has not substantially changed. 16 Female employees have an increasingly
visible presence in some blue-collar jobs, such as bus driver (forty-nine
percent) and bartender (forty-eight percent), but reports in the 1980s
numbered their share of skilled trade positions at only about twenty per-
cent. 17 So, too, women's increasing interest in "men's work" has not
been matched by a comparable increase in men's enthusiasm for "wo-
men's work." Within the most heavily female-dominated job sectors,
such as clerical work, male representation has not significantly
changed.18
Defenders of the conventional equal opportunity approach to em-
ployment discrimination typically dismiss these asymmetries as artifacts
of cultural lag or employee choice, and, in either case, as matters beyond
the scope of legitimate legal concern. From this perspective, much of the
existing gender gap is a transitory phenomenon, the result of conduct no
longer permitted under contemporary antidiscrimination doctrine. For-
mal prohibitions on gender bias in educational and employment practices
will, in time, prove sufficient to guarantee equal opportunity. Given the
available remedies for discriminatory treatment, any remaining disparity
in occupational status allegedly can be attributed to individual choice,
capabilities, and commitment; it is not a ground for further legal
intervention.19
Yet the vast majority of research suggests that the obstacles con-
fronting women workers are considerably more intractable than the
equal opportunity approach acknowledges. In identifying these obsta-
cles, we should note at the outset certain complexities in the concept of
occupational equality. It is not self-evident that proportional representa-
tion in all employment sectors is the ultimate ideal. To assume that,
under conditions of full equality, women will make precisely the same
occupational choices as men is to accept an assimilationist perspective
that many feminists renounce. But as long as there remains a strong
negative correlation between the concentration of women in a given oc-
cupation and its relative earnings and status, the persistence of gender
segregation is a major concern. We can leave questions about the precise
16. Deaux, Blue-Collar Barriers, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 287, 288 (1984).
17. The Job Market Opens up for the 68-Cent Woman, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1987, at 6, col. 4;
see Women in the Work Force; Supreme Court Issues" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter 1986 House Hearings] (statement of Cynthia Marano, Executive Director, Wider Opportunities
for Women).
18. See Bielby & Baron, Undoing Discrimination: Job Integration and Comparable Worth, in
EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 228 (male preferences have not changed).
19. See sources cited infra notes 20-21.
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degree of sex-role differentiation in the ideal society open without losing
sight of the disadvantages confronting women in this one.
Analysis of those disadvantages should distinguish problems along
two dimensions. Workforce inequalities reflect the relatively low status
and pay in female- dominated occupations, as well as the factors discour-
aging women's entry and advancement in alternative employment con-
texts. These phenomena in turn depend on complex interrelationships
among individual choices, social norms, discriminatory practices, and in-
stitutional structures.
B. Individual Choice and Socialization Patterns.
1. Human Capital Approaches. Although individual choice plays
an important role in virtually all theories of occupational inequality, the
nature of that role is the subject of considerable dispute. According to
human capital models of labor force participation, gender differences in
earnings and occupational status are largely attributable to differences in
career investments. 20 In essence, these models assume that women seek
to balance work and family commitments by selecting female-dominated
occupations that tend not to require extended training, long hours, inflex-
ible schedules, or skills that deteriorate with absence.21 Under these the-
ories, the solution to women's workplace inequality lies with women
themselves. In their crudest form, human capital approaches lead to a
kind of Marie Antoinette response to occupational stratification: if wo-
men want positions with greater pay, prestige, and power, they should
make different career investments; if female nurses want pay scales
equivalent to male hotel clerks', let them become hotel clerks. 22
Human capital approaches are problematic on several levels. Esti-
mates vary widely concerning the percentage of the wage gap that is at-
tributable to human capital factors such as education, experience, hours
worked, and so forth. However, most studies have concluded that these
characteristics cannot account for more than half of current gender dis-
20. G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 178-80 (2d ed. 1975); see Blau &Jusenius, Economists'Ap-
proaches to Sex Segregation in the Labor Market: An Appraisal, in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION 181, 185-88 (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan eds.
1976).
21. See Hartmann, Roos & Trieman, An Agenda for Basic Research on Comparable Worth, in
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 22. See generally G. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF
PLENTY 168 (1984).
22. See Manufacturers Group Hits Comparable Worth in Pay, L.A. Times, Nov. 24, 1984, § 1,
at 24, cols. 1-2 (quoting Alexander B. Trowbridge, President, National Association of
Manufacturers).
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parities.23 On the whole, women who make comparable investments in
time, training, and experience still advance less far and less quickly than
men.
2 4
Even in their most sophisticated forms, human capital approaches
leave a vast range of questions unanswered. What accounts for cross-
cultural variations and historical changes in occupational segregation?
Why do females choose to be nurses rather than hotel clerks, or, for that
matter, truck drivers, whose job skills are even less likely to deteriorate
with absence? Why do unskilled hotel clerks earn more than highly edu-
cated nurses? Why don't male employees with family responsibilities dis-
proportionately choose jobs requiring shorter hours? Answers to these
questions require a more complex account of cultural norms and institu-
tional constraints.
2. Cultural Expectations. At the turn of the century, Charlotte
Perkins Gilman warned against making any assumptions about what
kinds of work men and women would freely choose until generation after
generation could grow up under equal conditions.25 American society
remains a considerable distance from that ideal, and occupational choices
have been colored by cultural expectations. At very early ages, children
begin absorbing cues about appropriate sex-role traits and occupations,
and only recently has that socialization process prompted serious con-
cern. For example, not until the 1970s did public attention focus on ste-
reotypes in children's books. What then became apparent was the
crudest form of gender generalization. In the world traditionally
presented to preschoolers, homemaking was women's sole occupation; in
one representative survey, fairies and water maidens were the only appar-
ent alternatives.26 Most fictional stories centered on males. Female
characters appeared mainly in supporting roles; boys had adventures,
while girls went shopping or lost bunnies that boys found. 27
Despite substantial progress over the last decade, the legacy of such
gender stereotypes persists. Most research indicates that by early adoles-
23. See, e.g., H. AARON & C. LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY 12-13
(1986); Hartmann, Roos & Trieman, An Agenda for Basic Research on Comparable Worth, in NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 13-43.
24. For a critical review of human capital theories and their inability to account for various
wage and occupational patterns, see Blau, Occupational Segregation and Labor Market Discrimina-
tion, in SEX SEGREGATION, supra note 10, at 117-27; Corcoran & Duncan, Work History, Labor
Force Attachment, and Earnings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3
(1979); England, The Failure of Human Capital Theory to Explain Occupational Sex Segregation, 17
J. HUM. RESOURCES 358 (1982).
25. See C. GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS 8, 146-68 (3d ed. 1900).
26. See A. OAKLEY, WOMAN'S WORK: THE HOUSEWIFE, PAST AND PRESENT 190 (1974).
27. J. HOLE & E. LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 333-35 (1971).
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cence, males and females have acquired different career expectations. In
general, women continue to express lower expectations for occupational
success than men and attach higher priorities to relational aspects of em-
ployment (such as opportunities to help others) than to opportunities for
formal recognition (in terms of money, status, or power).28
For many individuals, career decisions have been less the product of
fully informed and independent preferences than the result of preconcep-
tions about "women's work," which are shaped by cultural stereotypes,
family and peer pressure, and the absence of alternative role models.29
Many families have discouraged career choices that would conflict with
domestic duties, require geographic mobility, or entail greater prestige or
income for wives than for husbands. Such patterns can be especially pro-
nounced among some minority groups, where males' education may
carry greater priority than females'. 30 Women who have deviated from
traditional norms in job selection have generally received less social ap-
proval than those who have not. Job training, counseling, and recruit-
ment networks have also channeled women toward conventional
occupations, and socioeconomic barriers have limited employment aspi-
rations. Although increasing numbers of women are expressing the same
vocational preferences as men, a majority still choose traditional, female-
dominated occupations.3 1 Having made such choices, many women have
found it too costly-financially, psychologically, or logistically-to shift
careers in response to more complete information about other options.
Family obligations, seniority structures, and financial constraints have
converged to entrench the effects of sex-role socialization. 32
28. Research on women's differential expectations of success is summarized in D. KAUFMAN &
B, RICHARDSON, ACHIEVEMENT AND WOMEN: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS 49-50, 96
(1982); Mednick, Women and the Psychology of Achievement: Implications for Personal and Social
Change, in WOMEN IN THE WORK FORCE 48 (H.J. Bernardin ed. 1972). For general accounts of
sex-role socialization processes, see E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFER-
ENcES 275-374 (1974); Bern & Bem, Homogenizing the American Woman: The Power of an Uncon-
scious Ideology, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS 6 (P. Struhl & A. Jaggar eds. 1978); Bernard, Sex
Differences: An Overview, in BEYOND SEX-ROLE STEREOTYPES 14-15 (1976).
29. For a summary of research on explanations for continued sex segregation in the workplace,
see COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT & RELATED SOCIAL ISSUES, WOMEN'S WORK,
MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 63-68 (B. Reskin & H. Hartmann eds. 1986) [here-
inafter WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK]. For an overview of institutional mechanisms underlying
job training, assignments, mobility, and retention-all of which serve to limit women's opportuni-
ties-see Roos & Reskin, Institutional Factors Contributing to Sex Segregation in the Workplace, in
SEX SEGREGATION, supra note 10, at 235-56.
30. See A. MIRANDE & E. ENRIQUEZ, LA CHICANA: THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WOMAN
133-35 (1979).
31. See Cain, Prospects for Pay Equity in a Changing Economy, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra
note 9, at 137, 155.
32. See Rosen, Career Progress of Women: Getting In and Staying In, in WOMEN IN THE
WORK FORCE, supra note 28, at 70, 73.
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These socialization processes are reinforced by the mismatch be-
tween characteristics associated with femininity and characteristics asso-
ciated with vocational achievement. 33  The aggressiveness,
competitiveness, dedication, and emotional detachment thought neces-
sary for advancement in the most prestigious and well-paid occupations
are incompatible with traits commonly viewed as attractive in women:
cooperativeness, deference, sensitivity, and self-sacrifice. Similar discon-
tinuities have been apparent in blue-collar contexts requiring physical
strength, "toughness," or other seemingly masculine attributes. Despite
substantial progress toward gender equality over the last several decades,
these sexual stereotypes have been remarkably resilient. Women remain
subject to the familiar double bind: they are criticized for being too femi-
nine or not feminine enough. Those who conform to accepted stereo-
types appear to lack the initiative necessary for occupational success,
while those who are more assertive are judged arrogant, aggressive, or
abrasive. 34 A "third sex" in vocational contexts has yet to emerge. 35
Different socialization patterns have also led women to structure
their priorities in ways that mesh poorly with occupational dynamics.
Although cultural commitments to equal opportunity in vocational
spheres have steadily increased, they have not translated into equal obli-
gations in domestic spheres. Most contemporary studies have indicated
that women still perform about seventy percent of the family tasks in an
average household.36 Employed wives spend about twice as much time
on homemaking tasks as employed husbands.37 Women also head ninety
33. See L. LARWOOD & M. WOOD, WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT 29-40 (1977) (discussing gen-
der-based stereotypes and barriers to women in management).
34. See also Prather, Why Can't Women Be More Like Men: A Summary of the Sociopsycho-
logical Factors Hindering Women's Advancement in the Professions, in WOMEN IN THE PROFES-
SIONS: WHAT'S ALL THE Fuss ABoUT? 14, 14-15, 22-23 (1971) (women competing for powerful
and responsible positions caught in "double bind" of being either too aggressive or too feminine).
See A. THEODORE, THE CAMPUS TROUBLEMAKERS: ACADEMIC WOMEN IN PROTEST 51, 77
(1986); See also sources cited infra note 55.
35. See generally P. MCBROOM, THE THIRD SEX: THE NEW PROFESSIONAL WOMAN (1986)
(studying women in financial careers to explore concepts of the professional woman, combining
feminine identity and professional behavior).
36. Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example
of Housework 6 SIGNS 366, 385 (1981) (research indicates that married women do 70% of house-
work, regardless of their employment status); see Status Report: Who Does the Work, Ms. MAO.,
Feb. 1988, at 19; see also G. STAINES & J. PLECK, THE IMPACT OF WORK SCHEDULES ON THE
FAMILY 63 (1983) (working women generally spend more time with children and on housework
than do working men); Burros, Women: Out of the House But Not Out of the Kitchen, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 1 (citing poll showing working, married women still perform a majority of
household tasks).
37. O'Neill, Role Differentiation and the Gender Gap in Wage Rates, in I WOMEN AND WORK:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW 50, 56-60 (L. Larwood, A. Stromberg & B. Gutek eds. 1985) (citing statistic
for amount of time spent by married men and women on household tasks); see also H. BOHEN & A.
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percent of the nation's single-parent households, which impose special
burdens.38 The problems are particularly acute for women of color, who
are most likely to have such responsibilities and least able to afford help
in meeting them.3 9
As subsequent discussion suggests, individual choices have also been
constrained by unconscious discrimination and workplace structures.40
The result is a convergence of self-perpetuating social signals that rein-
force occupational inequalities. Males' and females' different career in-
vestments have been heavily dependent on their perceptions of different
opportunities. Women have long faced relatively low wages in tradi-
tional vocations and substantial barriers to advancement in non-tradi-
tional pursuits. Under such circumstances, it has been economically
rational for working couples to give priority to the husband's career, to
relocate in accordance with his job prospects, and to assign wives a dis-
proportionate share of family obligations. The gender division of labor in
the home and workplace have been mutually reinforcing patterns.
Subordinate occupational status has encouraged women to make lower
career investments and to assume greater domestic responsibilities, both
of which help to perpetuate that subordination. Breaking this cycle will
require treating individual choices not as fixed and independent phenom-
ena, but as responses to cultural forces that are open to redirection.
C. Discriminatory Practices and Occupational Dynamics.
Attempts to move beyond individual-choice-based models of occu-
pational inequality have proceeded on several levels. One approach has
focused on occupational segregation. Some commentators, drawing on
dual-labor-market theories, have stressed men's concentration in the pri-
mary sector of the workforce and women's concentration in the secon-
dary sector. The primary sector, generally characterized by high capital
investment, advanced technology, unionization, opportunities for promo-
tion, and low employee turnover, also has relatively high wages and ben-
VIVEROS-LONG, BALANCING JOBS AND FAMILY LIFE 81 (1981) ("Employed women everywhere
spend an average of three to five hours a day on home chores; employed men, on the other hand,
spend an average of one-half to one-and-one-half hours per day on such chores."); L. GENEVIE & E.
MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT 381-93 (1987) (discussing conflicts between home and job
that working mothers experience); sources cited supra note 36.
38. See Peterson, The Feminization of Poverty, 21 J. ECON. IssuES 329, 331 (1987) (discussing
poverty level of families headed by women).
39. See THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1987-88, supra note 5, at 28 (noting high rate of pregnancy
for unmarried black teenagers and large number of black female heads of households living in pov-
erty). See generally R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST; THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN
AFFLUENT AMERICA (1986) (description of lives of women and children living at or near the edge of
poverty).
40. See infra notes 41-70 and accompanying text.
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efits. The secondary sector, with the converse structural characteristics,
tends to have lower pay scales and benefits, which in turn encourage
higher turnover and provide fewer incentives for advancement.41 Other
commentators have stressed more general effects of occupational crowd-
ing. Since women have remained clustered in a relatively small number
of female-dominated occupations, the resulting oversupply of labor in
those fields has depressed wage rates and has increased unemployment.42
Such approaches, although useful to a point, have proved too reduc-
tive or restrictive to provide a full account of occupational inequality. In
part, these approaches' limitations reflect the level of analysis on which
they proceed; their focus on surface explanations of gender disparities
tends to leave fundamental causal questions unaddressed. Why, for ex-
ample, have women remained crowded in certain sectors of the labor
market, and why have those sectors commanded relatively low status and
prestige? Why do females in predominately male occupations have lower
pay scales and fewer promotion opportunities despite comparable
qualifications? 43
In seeking answers to such questions, commentators have accumu-
lated increasing evidence concerning various forms of discrimination:
deliberate, statistical, and unconscious. On the most overt level, as econ-
omists such as Gary Becker have argued, market forces do not necessar-
ily discourage deliberate bias against women or minorities when
employers have developed a "taste for discrimination." 44 Such tastes,
founded on personal prejudice, customer or co-worker preference, or fa-
voritism toward male "breadwinners," have been identified in a wide
range of contexts.45 Before passage of antidiscrimination legislation in
the early 1960s, many employers were surprisingly public about their pri-
vate biases. During the nineteenth century, intermingling between male
and female workers was often viewed as "actively operative for evil."'46
Although twentieth-century employers have appeared less concerned
41. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN AND WORK 20-22 (A. Amsden ed. 1980) (discussing
segmentation of labor market into primary and secondary markets).
42. See Blau, Occupational Segregation and Labor Market Discrimination, in SEX SEGREGA-
TION, supra note 10, at 117, 126; WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra note 29, at 10-13.
43. See generally Hartmann, Internal Labor Markets and Gender: A Case Study of Promotion,
in GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE 59 (C. Brown & J. Pleckman eds. 1987) (reviewing theories of
gender differentiation in labor markets and showing, by case study, that sex-role and racial stere-
otyping contribute to unequal promotions and earnings).
44. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14-17 (2d ed. 1971).
45. See id. at 9-12; sources cited infra notes 46-48.
46. For nineteenth-century views, see A. AMES, SEX IN INDUSTRY 30-31 (1875), quoted in R.
SMUTS, WOMEN AND WORK IN AMERICA 118 (1959). See generally Goldin, The Earnings Gap in
Historical Perspective, in 1 COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 12, at 3, 3-19 (explaining changes
between 1890 and 1980 in ratios of male to female earnings).
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about the moral dimensions of occupational integration, many have
viewed it as economically inefficient or culturally inappropriate. 47 As
late as 1970, some job advertisements openly specified "males pre-
ferred,"' 48 and many workplaces had separate job titles, pay scales, and
promotion channels for males and females performing substantially the
same work.
Although changing attitudes and statutory mandates have made
overt discrimination increasingly rare, some of its legacy remains. Con-
tinuing assumptions have been that male workers will resist female col-
leagues or supervisory personnel, that male consumers of certain services
or products will not relate well to female employees, and that women
lack the capacity or commitment for positions calling for physical
strength, extended training, or managerial skills.49 Litigation in the late
1980s still revealed claims such as those advanced by owners of tuna
fishing boats that excluded women. According to these owners, the pres-
ence of female employees would "destroy morale and distract the crew";
their boats would "catch fewer fish if a woman is on board."50 Similar
biases have left women of color doubly disadvantaged.5'
In theory, a well-functioning free market should serve to erode such
discriminatory patterns, since employers who do not indulge arbitrary
prejudices should have a competitive advantage. In practice, however,
occupational segregation and differential reward structures, once estab-
47. See V. OPPENHEIMER, THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 107-09 (1970)
(discussing employers' strong preference for men in supervisory positions if work groups are gender-
integrated). See generally J. MATrHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 187-232
(1982) (tracing development of sex-typed jobs in consumer services, the professions, blue-collar
work, and office work).
48. Sandier, Patterns of Discrimination in Higher Education in New York, in NEW YORK CITY
COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WOMEN'S ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 567, 575 (1972) (1970
advertisement for assistant professor).
49. See J. LYLE & J. Ross, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 9-10 (1973); WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES:
EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 61-62 (D. Trieman & H. Hartmann eds. 1981) [hereinafter
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES] (questioning perceived biases of male employees and customers as
basis for discrimination against female employees); Bielby & Baron, Undoing Discrimination: Job
Integration and Comparable Worth, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 215 (obs requiring
physical strength seen as inappropriate for women).
50. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1988).
51. See S. EDSON, PUSHING THE LIMITS: THE FEMALE ADMINISTRATIVE ASPIRANT 171-93
(1988) (noting special demands on black females seeking positions as high-school administrators); J.
FERNANDEZ, supra note 15, at 73 (double stigmatization of black women may account for their
criticism of female managers); Simpson, The Daughters of Charlotte Ray: The Career Development
Process During the Exploratory and Establishment Stages of Black Women Attorneys, I 1 SEx ROLES
113 (1984) (survey of black female attorneys on factors enabling them to overcome double obstacles
of race and sex). See generally Bielby, Modern Prejudice and Institutional Barriers to Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity for Minorities, 43 J. Soc. ISSUES 79 (1987) (commenting on proposals for reducing
race bias in the workplace); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious racism).
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lished, can be highly resistant to change. The more insulated the labor
market from competitive forces, the more resilient these biases may
prove.
Even reasonably competitive markets will permit what economists
label "statistical discrimination," that is, discrimination premised on gen-
eralizations that are inaccurate in a large percentage of cases, but are
cheaper to indulge than to ignore.52 For example, if an employer believes
that female workers have a higher turnover rate than males, and that it is
expensive or difficult to screen for job commitment in advance, then it
makes sense to channel women toward relatively low-status, low-paid po-
sitions where they are easily replaced. Although recent data suggest that
men and women with comparable qualifications and holding comparable
jobs do not in fact have different turnover rates, the residual effects of
statistical discrimination often linger.53 Once jobs become "typed" as
male or female, socialization processes tend to perpetuate those labels.
A final, and in contemporary society perhaps the most intransigent,
form of discrimination operates at unconscious levels. Employer deci-
sionmaking has reflected the same gender biases and stereotypes that
have constrained employees' vocational choices. Psychological research
suggests that most decisionmakers rate more positively those who con-
form to stereotypical notions of masculine and feminine behavior than
those who do not. Individuals are also more likely to recall evidence that
supports rather than challenges such stereotypes.5 4 Given the disconti-
nuities between traits associated with femininity and those associated
with vocational achievement, female performance is often undervalued. 55
Since research involving racial bias reveals similar patterns, women of
color face special obstacles.5 6
More specific clinical and longitudinal research makes the point di-
rectly. For example, surveys of a wide variety of decisionmakers have
revealed that identical resumes are rated significantly lower if an appli-
52. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972).
53. See L. WAITE & S. BERRYMAN, WOMEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 75-76
(1985).
54., K. DEAUX, THE BEHAVIOR OF WOMEN AND MEN 24-34 (1976) (reviewing effects of sex
stereotypes on performance evaluations); Hagen & Kahn, Discrimination Against Competent Wo-
men, 5 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 362, 371-74 (1975) (reviewing empirical data on bias against
women in leadership roles); Hamilton, Some Thoughts on the Cognitive Approach, in COGNITIVE
PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 333, 340 (D. Hamilton ed. 1981) (ster-
eotypical expectations influence evaluation of data).
55. C. EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 87-92
(1988); A. MORRISON, R. WHITE & E. VAN VELSOR, BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING 61-63 (1987);
see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
56. Unconscious racism is considered in Symposium, Black Employment Opportunities" Macro
and Micro Perspectives, 43 J. Soc. IssuES, No. 1, at 1 (1987). See also sources cited supra note 51.
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cant is a woman rather than a man.5 7 In analogous studies, both male
and female subjects have often given lower ratings to the same art or
scholarly works when the artist or author is thought to be a woman.5 8
Men's success is more likely to be attributed to ability and females' to
luck, a pattern that has obvious implications for employment
decisionmaking.5 9
Such unconscious bias affects not only opportunities for individual
workers, but also reward structures for women as a group. This point
was well illustrated by a survey of the federal government's Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, which rates the complexity of tasks in some 30,000
jobs and has influenced many public and private employers' compensa-
tion schemes. Among the occupations rating lowest in the 1975 Diction-
ary edition were foster mother, nursery-school teacher, and practical
nurse-all of which were thought equally or less demanding than park-
ing lot attendant and "offal man," whose respective responsibilities were
to park cars and to "shovel[ ] ice into [a] chicken offal container."
Although repeated critiques prompted substantial progress in a later Dic-
tionary edition, the legacy of earlier biases remains pervasive in many
employment settings. 60
Anthropological studies suggest similar evidence of gender bias.
Although cultures vary considerably in the tasks they allocate to each
sex, their valuation patterns have been consistent. As Margaret Mead
once noted, there have been villages in which men fish and women weave
and villages in which women fish and men weave, but in either type of
village the work done by men is more valued than the work done by
women.
61
57. Lott, The Devaluation of Women's Competence, 41 J. Soc. IssuES 43, 50 (1985); see Rosen
& Jerdee, Effects of Applicants Sex and Difficulty of Job on Evaluations of Candidates for Managerial
Positions, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 511 (1974) (male applicants for managerial positions were
accepted more frequently and evaluated more favorably than equally qualified female applicants).
58. Goldberg, Are Women Prejudiced Against Women?, TRANS-ACTION, Apr. 1968, at 28;
Lott, supra note 57, at 48. But cf Ferber & Huber, Sex of Student and Instructor: A Study of
Student Bias, 80 AM. J. Soc. 949 (1975) (student evaluations of former college teachers failed to
support Goldberg's conclusion that women are prejudiced against women).
59. Lott, supra note 57, at 51; Shepela & Viviano, Some Psychological Factors Affecting Job
Segregation and Wages, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION: TECHNICAL POS-
SIBILITIES AND POLITICAL REALITIES 47, 51-52 (H. Remick ed. 1984) [hereinafter COMPARABLE
WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION].
60. See L. HOWE, PINK COLLAR WORKERS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF WOMEN'S WORK 236-40
(1977); Steinberg & Haignere, Equitable Compensation: Methodological Criteria for Comparable
Worth, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 157, 165.
61. For Margaret Mead's findings, see M. MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE: A STUDY OF THE
SEXES IN A CHANGING WORLD 159-60 (1st ed. 1949); CENTER FOR PHILOSOPHY & PUB. POLICY,
PAYING WOMEN WHAT THEY'RE WORTH 1 (1983).
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Unconscious gender prejudices not only affect evaluation of female
performance, but also affect performance itself. Low expectations of
achievement frequently become self-fulfilling prophecies. Those who ex-
pect inadequate performance tend to signal their assumptions in subtle
ways, and this negative feedback leads to anxiety, mistakes, and dimin-
ished aspirations. Such consequences then reinforce the initial adverse
expectations, and a self-perpetuating cycle continues. 62
Preconceptions about women's lower career commitment create
analogous patterns. A common assumption is that many women will
"stop being productive when [they] become reproductive. ' 63 Deci-
sionmakers who expect higher turnover among female employees will
often structure women's jobs to minimize the costs of replacement. In
effect, that means minimizing challenge, training, and responsibility,
which in turn encourages boredom, frustration, and high turnover.64
More overt, although often unintentional, forms of collegial bias
have comparable consequences. Women in a wide range of employment
settings remain outside the informal networks of support, guidance, and
information exchange that are critical to advancement. 65 Such problems
often begin in educational or job training programs and increase in work-
place environments. 66 Related problems involve sexual harassment,
which not only impairs performance and restricts advancement, but also
discourages women from entering male-dominated environments. 67 All
of these problems are especially acute for women of color, who face un-
conscious discrimination on two fronts, and whose small numbers make
mentoring and role modeling especially difficult.
62. A. THEODORE, supra note 34, at 6-9, 237-40. For discussion of "feedback discrimination,"
in which employers, by denying women training and reinforcing "feminine behavior," ensure that
women will exhibit the characteristics that employers attribute to them, see Blau, Occupational Seg-
regation and Labor Market Discrimination, in SEX SEGREGATION, supra note 10, at 123.
63. A. THEODORE, supra note 34, at 6.
64. Id.; Blau, Occupational Segregation and Labor Market Discrimination, in SEX SEGREGA-
TION, supra note 10, at 123.
65. Collegial bias in professional and business contexts is considered in COMMISSION ON WO-
MEN IN THE PROFESSIONS, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 7-12 (1988);
C. EPSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE: OPTIONS AND LIMITS IN PROFESSIONAL CAREERS 172-75 (1970);
C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 265-302 (1981); R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORA-
TION 18-25 (1977); Prather, supra note 34, at 23. See also Rhode, supra note j.
For discussions of bias in the blue-collar context, see S. MARTIN, BREAKING AND ENTERING:
POLICEWOMEN ON PATROL 109-57 (1980); L. ZIMMER, WOMEN GUARDING MEN 52-77 (1986).
66. See, e.g., M. WALSHOK, BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON THE MALE FRONTIER
158, 168-70, 186, 204 (1981) (women excluded from normal channels of recruitment and on-the-job
training); Deaux, supra note 16, at 294 (blue-collar women receive less training and information than
male co-workers).
67. See B. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 42-60 (1985); C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
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As long as women constitute small minorities in non-traditional em-
ployment contexts, these problems are likely to remain serious. The
presence of a few token females may do little to alter underlying stereo-
types, and the pressures placed on such individuals make successful per-
formance less likely. Members of underrepresented groups perform
under a special spotlight; their performance is heavily scrutinized and
often assessed under particularly rigorous standards.68 Moreover, indi-
viduals who seek to fit in by changing the culture rather than themselves
face additional problems. The woman who "make[s] too much of the
'woman issue'" is subject to significant risk.69
Given these barriers and biases, women must work harder to suc-
ceed, and when they do, they must deal with the envy and anxiety that
success arouses. 70 Those who do not advance under such circumstances,
or who become frustrated and opt for different employment, confirm the
adverse stereotypes that had worked against their advancement in the
first instance. The perception remains that women "can't make it" by
conventional standards, or are less committed to doing so. In either case,
they do not seem to warrant the same investment in training, assistance,
and promotion opportunities as their male counterparts. Again, the re-
sult is a subtle but self-perpetuating cycle in which individual choices are
constrained by discriminatory practices.
Taken as a whole, this body of research leaves no doubt about the
lingering effects of gender bias. Whatever weight is assigned to particular
factors-dual markets, occupational crowding, or deliberate, statistical,
or unconscious discrimination-it is clear that societal prejudice has
played a substantial role. Not only has gender bias shaped employment
opportunities and salary patterns, it has also affected the way workplace
structures have adapted to women's participation.
D. Institutional Constraints.
Just after the turn of the century, in Muller v. Oregon, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the "obvious" respects in which performance of wo-
68. For discussion of the pressures on "token" women, see R. KANTER, supra note 65, at 207;
Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token
Women, 82 AM. J. Soc. 965, 971-72 (1977); Fuebrer & Schilling, The Values ofAcademe: Sexism as
a Natural Consequence, 41 J. Soc. Issuas 29, 37, 39-40 (1985).
69. A. MORRISON, R. WHITE & E. VAN VELSOR, supra note 55, at 38; see also G. LANoUE &
B. LEE, ACADEMICS IN COURT 55-58 (1987) (female faculty member denied promotion for "aggres-
sive" behavior and for advocating equal athletic facilities for women). See generally A. THEODORE,
supra note 34.
70. For research reflecting adverse reactions to successful women, see J. FERNANDEZ, supra
note 51, at 79-85; 1. FRIEZE, J. PARSONS, P. JOHNSON, D. RUBLE & G. ZELLMAN, WOMEN AND
SEX ROLES 252-53 (1978); Hagen & Kahn, supra note 54, at 371-74.
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man's "maternal functions place[d] her at a disadvantage in the struggle
for subsistence. ' 71 Three-quarters of a century later, the most funda-
mental of those disadvantages remain. The majority of women work in
occupational environments designed by and for men. The way in which
the workplace has been structured, advancement criteria defined, and do-
mestic responsibilities allocated have all tended to perpetuate gender
inequalities.
In contemporary American society, any individual who seeks to bal-
ance significant work and family commitments confronts substantial ob-
stacles. Since, as noted earlier, women continue to assume an unequal
share of homemaking obligations, they also experience an unequal share
of workplace difficulties.72 The most obvious problems involve the
length and rigidity of most work schedules, the absence of adequate pa-
rental leave provisions, and inadequacies in child care services.
By the early 1980s, eighty percent of non-farm employees were
holding full-time jobs, and about eighty-five percent of those jobs re-
quired a fixed forty-hours-plus workweek.7 3 The small number of posi-
tions that have permitted flexible hours or compressed schedules have
generally done so within narrow bounds. 74 Opportunities for permanent
part-time work have been constrained in a different sense. The demand
for such jobs has greatly exceeded their availability, despite the relatively
low pay and benefits that most part-time positions command.75
Although public support for reduced hours, job sharing, and home work
sites has been steadily increasing, most of the options available have been
in low-level, female-dominated areas lacking benefits and opportunities
for advancement. 76
Resistance to more flexible structures has come from a variety of
sources. Despite empirical findings to the contrary, many employers
have overestimated the difficulties and underestimated the benefits of
71. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
72. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
73. OFFICE OF INFORMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TEN MILLION AMERICANS WORK
FLEXIBLE SCHEDULES, Two MILLION WORK FULL-TIME IN THREE TO FOUR AND A HALF DAYS
(1981).
74. See T. GREIS, THE DECLINE OF ANNUAL HOURS WORKED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1947, at 216-17 (1984) (surveying perceived problems with compressed workweeks); A. HARRIMAN,
THE WORK/LEISURE TRADE OFF: REDUCED WORK TIME FOR MANAGERS AND PROFESSIONALS
159, 161-63 (1982) (noting limited availability of modified workweeks).
75. See A. COHEN & H. GORDON, ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES 85 (1978); Holden &
Hansen, Part-Time Work Full-Time Work and Occupational Segregation, in GENDER IN THE
WORKPLACE 217, 218-22 (G. Brown & J. Pleckman eds. 1987) (discussing relative concentrations of
women in full-time and part-time employment); see also supra note 5.
76. S. RONER, ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES 8 (1984); Holden & Hansen, supra note 75,
at 234.
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such innovations. Decisionmakers have feared resentment among work-
ers with more demanding schedules, and have often magnified the coor-
dination problems caused by absent employees.77 Many employers and
clients have been put off by the unavailability and seeming lack of com-
mitment of part-time workers, and those attitudes have affected assign-
ment and promotion decisions. For example, studies in upper-level
business and professional contexts have revealed widespread disparage-
ment of anything less than full-time work.78 In non-professional job sec-
tors, union leaders have been similarly unenthusiastic about the loss of
full-time positions.79
Related problems involve the inadequacy of parental leave policies
and child care programs. Data from the late 1980s indicate that about
three-fifths of female workers are not entitled to wage replacement, and
over one-third cannot count on returning to their same positions after a
normal period of maternity leave. America remains alone among West-
ern industrialized nations in its failure to guarantee such benefits. 80 Wo-
men who do not come back "faster than a speeding bullet" after
childbirth have faced substantial risks. Even fewer employees are enti-
tled to temporary leaves for parenting or care of disabled relatives.81 A
still more chronic problem involves the inadequacies of child care pro-
grams. Although by the late 1980s over fifty percent of mothers with
young children were in the workforce, less than one percent of private
employers were providing any child care assistance.8 2 Public support has
77. A. COHEN & H. GORDON, supra note 75, at 75; see Rhode, supra note t, at 1185-86 (resist-
ance faced by women attorneys juggling career and family).
78. For barriers to part-time work in the legal profession, see Project, Law Firms and Lawyers
with Children: An Empirical Analysis of Family/Work Conflict, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1263, 1297
(1982); Rhode, supra note t, at 1185-86; Brill, Labor Pains, Am. Law., Jan./Feb. 1986, at 1, col. 1,
13, cols. 2-4; Sylvester, How Firms Cope with Motherhood, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 4, 28,
col. 1; Kingson, Women in the Law Say Path Is Limited by "Mommy Track "N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
1988, at I, col. 5.
79. WORK IN AM. INST., NEW WORK SCHEDULES FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 124-28 (1981)
(discussing reluctance of labor unions to lobby for new work schedules out of fear of disrupting
overtime provisions); Christopherson, supra note 5, at 10-13.
80. See CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS ON WOMEN'S ISSUES, FACT SHEET. ON PARENTAL LEAVE
LEGISLATION (1985); S, KAMERMAN & A. KAHN, supra note 5, at 54-57. See generally A. RADI-
GAN, CONCEPT AND COMPROMISE (1988) (surveying data on paid maternity leave and tracing his-
tory of proposed legislation).
81. See sources cited supra note 78; R. SPALTER-ROTH & H. HARTmANN, UNNECESSARY
LOSSES: COSTS TO AMERICANS OF THE LACK OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 2 (1988) (report
for Institute for Women's Policy Research); Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 384 (1984-1985).
82. 1986 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 5, 7 (statement of Jill Houghton Emery, Acting
Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor).
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been similarly lacking.8 3
For women, the inadequacy of flexible scheduling options, tempo-
rary leave provisions, and child care services carry significant occupa-
tional consequences. Short-term losses result when female employees
find it necessary to forgo promotional and training opportunities, or to
leave a particular job, together with its seniority and benefit provisions.
Long-term costs result from women's discontinuous work history, which
makes advancement within high-paying job sectors more difficult. For
most women, the choice is to curtail either employment or family com-
mitments, and whichever option they elect, the result is to perpetuate a
decisionmaking structure insulated from their concerns. Those who ad-
vance to the positions with greatest power over policies governing paren-
tal leaves, working schedules, child care, and related issues are those least
likely to have experienced significant work-family conflicts.8 4 To pro-
mote equality between the sexes and to improve the quality of life for
both of them will require fundamental changes in employment policies.
II. THE LEGAL RESPONSE
As in other contexts, the law's primary approach to these occupa-
tional issues has been to focus on gender differences rather than gender
disadvantages. It has sought to prevent those with comparable abilities
from experiencing different treatment because of sex. Under the equal
protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, courts have prohib-
ited various forms of intentional discrimination.8 5 Under title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, courts have barred both intentionally discriminatory
actions and certain facially neutral conduct that has a disproportionate
adverse impact on women and is not justified by business necessity.8 6
Various legislative and administrative regulations have also required gov-
83. See R. SIDEL, supra note 39, at 118-28 (tracing history of government-sponsored child care
programs). See generally Hearings on Childcare Before the U.S. Commission on Education and La-
bor, U.S. House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. - (held Apr. 21, 1988; hearing print
forthcoming) (testimony of Heidi Hartmann); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: WHO's MINDING THE KIDS? (1987) (documenting
mothers' reliance on their own resources for child care).
84. See generally sources cited supra notes 14, 65.
85. See, eg., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
86. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (height and weight requirements that
disproportionately exclude women from jobs not related to such requirements violate Civil Rights
Act); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (title VII "proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation"). See
generally Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 947, 947-49
(1982) (reviewing title VII doctrine).
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ernment contractors to implement affirmative action programs.8 7 Taken
together, these strategies have played a critical role in expanding wo-
men's employment opportunities. This approach has not, however, ade-
quately confronted the deeper institutional and ideological forces that
perpetuate gender disadvantage.
Part of the problem stems from the law's focus on individual intent
and its unwillingness to challenge conduct that does not seem specifically
designed to discriminate against women.88 Given the unconscious level
at which much gender bias operates, as well as the costs, both financial
and psychological, of initiating legal action, such a framework has lim-
ited value.8 9 A related problem involves the inadequacy of governmental
and private-sector support for policies mandating flexible scheduling,
temporary leaves, child care assistance, and strong forms of affirmative
action.90
In effect, traditional approaches hav e centered on equalizing wo-
men's opportunities within conventional workplace structures. The task
remaining is to challenge the structures themselves, and their underlying
priorities and premises. This, in turn, will require a broad range of initia-
tives, including a redirection of the law's focus on individual intent, an
expanded understanding and implementation of affirmative action poli-
cies, and a restructuring of workplace institutions to allow better accom-
modation of family commitments. Since I have discussed these
initiatives at greater length elsewhere, my intent here is to center atten-
tion on a final and equally crucial set of strategies, those concerning pay
equity.91
A. Pay Equity.
By the close of the 1970s, as the limitations of conventional antidis-
crimination approaches became increasingly apparent, women's rights
organizations sought new strategies to secure greater pay equity between
the sexes. A primary objective was to obtain comparable pay for jobs of
comparable worth.
87. See, e.g., Revised Order No. 4, Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1988) (cov-
ering non-construction contractors).
88. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1103 (1978); Sullivan, Sins of Dis-
crimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV. 78, 80 (1986).
89. See Lawrence, supra note 71, at 328-44; Rhode, supra note t, at 1187-93.
90. See sources cited supra notes 81-83; sources cited infra note 91.
91. See D. RHODE, supra note t; Rhode, Definitions of Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 8; Rhode, supra note t, at 1193-95, 1196-202, 1205-07.
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1. The Evolution of Comparable Worth. As a conceptual frame-
work, comparable worth has historical analogues in medieval notions of
a "just price," and in the early twentieth-century theories of the British
Fabian Sidney Webb.92 As a practical strategy, the concept emerged in
this country during World War II. Although the federal government
had made earlier, intermittent efforts to reduce sex-based wage discrimi-
nation in the civil service, it was not until the national mobilization of the
1940s that prominent officials first identified such discrimination as a se-
rious problem. To the War Labor Board, some legal intervention seemed
necessary to preserve the morale not only of female workers, but also of
their male counterparts at home and on the front, who worried that femi-
nization of the workforce would undermine existing wage structures.93
Accordingly, the Board decreed that there should be "no discrimination
between employees whose production [was] substantially the same on
comparable jobs."' 94 But Board enforcement efforts proved woefully in-
adequate to secure equal pay even for identical jobs, and standards gov-
erning comparability never developed. 95
In any event, Board directives lost force once the war was over.
Subsequent congressional proposals that would have prohibited "paying
female employees at a lower rate than males for work of comparable
quality or quantity" failed to come to a vote.96 Although similar lan-
guage reappeared in the initial drafts of the Equal Pay Act during the
early 1960s, this language met with a similar fate.97 Neither sponsors nor
their critics were prepared for the specter of federal intruders "trooping
around all over the country ... harassing business with their various
interpretations of the term 'comparable.' "98
Two decades later, that caricature no longer appeared so disquiet-
ing, particularly if the alternative was reliance solely on market forces to
determine wage hierarchies. Many manifestations of the invisible hand
92. Goldin, The Earnings Gap in Historical Perspective, in 1 COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note
12, at 4-5; Kessler-Harris, The Just Price, the Free Market, and the Value of Women, 14 FEMINIST
STUD. 235, 239-45 (1988).
93. 2 P. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT: FROM WORLD WAR I TO
THE PRESENT 355 (1980) (discussing arguments presented to War Labor Board).
94. Tobias & Anderson, What Really Happened to Rosie the Riveter? Demobilization and the
Female Labor Force, 1944-47, in WOMEN'S AMERICA 367-68 (L. Kerber & J. Mathews eds. 1982)
(quoting UAW memorandum that quotes Board decision).
95. 2 P. FONER, supra note 93, at 355-57.
96. E.g., S. 882, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., introduced, 109 CONG. REC. 2770 (1963).
97. See 109 CONG. REC. 2780 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Case regarding change in language from
"comparable" to "equal"); see also id. at 2714 (similar remarks by Rep. Dwyer).
98. 108 CONG. REC. 14,768 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Landrum on amendment to Equal Pay
Act of 1962); see 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 690-92; Note, Equal Pay, Comparable
Work and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657, 665-66 (1981).
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appeared visibly gender-biased. Feminists cited hosts of examples not
readily squared with merit principles: schoolteachers who earned less
than liquor store clerks, nurses who earned less than tree trimmers or
sign painters, and librarians who earned less than crossing guards or
water meter readers. 99 " Given the vast body of research pointing to un-
dervaluation of women's work, particularly work done by women of
color, market forces appeared to be unreliable guardians of equitable
compensation structures. 10
2. Job Evaluation Strategies: Relative Worth and Intrinsic Worth.
The most frequently proposed alternatives to market forces rely on for-
mal systems of job evaluation for establishing salaries. 10' Such ap-
proaches have become increasingly prevalent since World War II; an
estimated two-thirds of employees are currently subject to some formal
evaluation system.102 Methodologies vary, as does decisionmaking au-
thority. Participants in the evaluation process may include outside con-
sultants and worker representatives, as well as management.103
Although the technical aspects of job evaluation require more extended
analysis than is possible here, it is useful to distinguish the two basic
frameworks that are often lumped together under the generic label of
comparable worth.
The most common job evaluation system involves a "policy-captur-
ing" approach.1 4 This system focuses on the relative worth of particular
positions under existing wage scales, either the employer's own rates or
those of similarly situated employers. Through this approach, deci-
sionmakers identify factors relevant to compensation and score jobs in
terms of those factors, such as skill, responsibility, and working condi-
tions.105 Then, statistical regression techniques are used to assess the rel-
99. D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 168 (1986); see Savage, San Jose's
Equal Pay Plan Survives, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
100. See Malveaux, An Economic Perspective on Difference and Commonality Among Women, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8; NATIONAL COMM'N ON PAY EQUITY, supra note 3; see
also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
101. Schwab, Using Job Evaluations to Obtain Pay Equity, in 1 COMPARABLE WORTH, supra
note 12, at 83, 85. See generally WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 49, at 71-90 (discussing
conventional and statistical job evaluation approaches).
102. Steinberg, Identifying Wage Discrimination and Implementing Pay Equity Adjustments, in 1
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 12, at 99, 101.
103. See Schwab, Job Evaluation Research and Research Needs, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra
note 9, at 37, 45-46.
104. Clauss, Comparable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the Feasibility of Imple-
mentation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7, 52 (1986).
105. For example, whatever importance an employer determines to give mathematical skills,
such skills should carry the same weight in female- as well as male-dominated jobs. For further
elaboration, see id. at 41-54.
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ative importance of such factors in predicting current wages and to
establish a weight for each factor.10 6 Each job receives a rating based on
its weighted characteristics. This rating can serve as the basis for adjust-
ing pay scales or for setting salaries for new jobs, although deci-
sionmakers may make further modifications in response to market forces.
To pay equity advocates, such a policy-capturing approach is pri-
marily useful for identifying racial or gender biases in an employer's own
evaluation system. For example, statistical analysis can indicate the im-
portance an employer attaches to particular factors in male-dominated or
gender-integrated jobs and determine whether the same factors com-
mand the same financial reward in female-dominated positions. When
used in this fashion, such an approach often reveals underpayment of
"women's work" in terms of the employer's own criteria for
compensation. 107
From a pay equity perspective, the strengths of this system are also
the source of its limitation. By relying on the employer's own standards
to establish relative value, a policy-capturing technique avoids more sub-
jective and divisive issues about the intrinsic value of particular jobs.
Such a framework takes no position on what weight specific employment
characteristics should assume. It only demands that employers consis-
tently apply their own weighting systems across job categories, regardless
of the gender, race, and ethnicity of employees and the pay at which they
are willing to work. Although this approach is consistent with antidis-
crimination principles reflected in existing legislation, including title VII,
it does not accomplish one central objective of pay equity advocates-to
challenge societal devaluations of women's work. Since a policy-captur-
ing system uses existing wage rates to assess the relative importance of
job characteristics, it will reflect gender and racial biases that have tradi-
tionally affected those rates.
A more fundamental challenge to current norms is possible with
techniques that focus on intrinsic worth. Under such an approach, deci-
sionmakers generally define a priori the set of factors and the factor
weights that should serve as the basis for salary differentials. Typically,
this system will rank job characteristics such as skill, effort, responsibil-
ity, and working conditions, and then assign points to particular jobs
based on their weighted characteristics. Compensation levels can then be
adjusted to ensure parity between jobs with similar ratings. By valuing
job characteristics without explicit reference to employers' existing sala-
106. Id. at 52.
107. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON PAY EQUITY, supra note 3, at 86-104 (detailing undervalua-
tion of disproportionately black, Hispanic, and female job titles in New York state government em-
ployment); WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 49, at 71-78; Clauss, supra note 104, at 52-54.
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ries or market rates, such techniques often expose underpayment of
predominantly female occupations. Although employers can further ad-
just their compensation structures to reflect external pay rates as well as
internal rankings, an a priori system has the advantage of making such
adjustments visible. 108
To varying degrees, relative and intrinsic worth approaches can
challenge current wage structures. By the mid-1980s, one or both
frameworks were influential in shaping comparable worth litigation, leg-
islative lobbying, and collective bargaining strategies. 10 9
B. Critics of Comparable Worth.
From critics' perspectives, comparable worth presents a range of
problems. The central difficulty is how to define "worth.""10 Few sala-
ries are based solely on objective factors, such as the skill, responsibility,
and working conditions a job entails; the most cursory comparison of
income levels for cabinet officials and fashion models makes this point
directly. Any evaluation system involves subjective judgments, and such
judgments are especially prevalent in a priori intrinsic worth approaches.
Gender biases can enter at any number of points: in the choice and
weighting of factors to be compensated, in the application of these factors
to a given job, and in the selection of standards for determining exemp-
tions. 11' How much significance should be attached to particular skills
or working conditions, and how skills should be defined, are often open
to dispute. Given the inherent subjectivity of job assessment techniques,
it is scarcely surprising that different evaluators and evaluation systems
have attached different values to identical positions." 2
This subjectivity can lead to the kind of bias apparent in a salary
reevaluation study for New York state employees. That study concluded
108. See generally Remick, Major Issues in A Priori Application, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND
WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 59, at 99-117.
109. For an overview of state law and legislation, see Cook, Developments in Selected States, in
COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 59, at 267-83; Dean, Roberts &
Boone, Comparable Worth Under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPRABLE WORTH AND
WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 59, at 238-66; Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits
of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1754-56, 1797-801 (1986); Note, The Future of
Comparable Worth: Looking in New Directions, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1189, 1207-18 (1987).
110. See Schwab, Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 49, 59, 69 (E. Livemash ed. 1980) [hereinafter ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES] (noting lack of definition of worth, substantial subjective judgment involved in im-
plementing job evaluations, and need for further research on sex-role stereotyping).
111. See Id. at 59; infra notes 112-13.
112. See generally Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems With Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems,
in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 59, at 59-78; Killingsworth, The
Economics of Comparable Worth: Analytical, Empirical, and Policy Questions, in NEw DIRECTIONS,
supra note 9, at 6, 86-115.
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that acquired (and hence compensable) abilities were necessary for zoo
keepers in charge of baby animals, but that only innate (and hence non-
compensable) abilities were necessary for day care attendants responsible
for human infants.113
A related criticism of both intrinsic worth and relative worth ap-
proaches concerns issues of supply and demand. To take one of econo-
mists' favorite illustrations, the fact that water is cheaper than diamonds
has more to do with the abundance of water than with its "worth," in the
way that pay equity advocates generally use the term. An evaluation
system that considers only job content might, for example, dictate paying
similar salaries to professors of male-dominated disciplines such as law,
and more gender-integrated disciplines such as English, even if legal aca-
demics were in shorter supply and could command much higher wages
for alternative uses of their skills. Such evaluative approaches might
make it difficult for any particular employer to attract and retain workers
in areas of tight labor supply, and might distort signals to potential em-
ployees about labor needs. 114
The experience of one General Electric plant in the mid-1980s illus-
trates critics' concerns. That plant reportedly had 3000 women on a
waiting list for openings as assemblers of radio components, a female-
dominated occupation. No such labor supply was available for certain
male-dominated packaging positions, which had comparable rankings in
terms of job characteristics. Since GE paid the female assemblers less
than the male packagers, but eight times more than workers who per-
formed the same assembling functions in Japan, the potential competitive
consequences of revaluing women's jobs were significant. Lowering or
freezing male packagers' wages could cause labor shortages, increased
turnover, and worker resentment. Increasing female assemblers' wages
could necessitate higher prices, which might eventually result in lower
sales, production, and employment. 115
If, under the threat of legal liability or other government mandates,
domestic employers had to make comparable wage adjustments, the re-
sulting price escalations would contribute to inflation and, in some sec-
tors, could diminish American industry's ability to compete with
113. See Lauter, How to Factor the Value of Workers'Skills, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 24, col.
1.
114. See Levin, Comparable Worth: The Feminist Road to Socialism, COMMENTARY, Sept.
1984, at 13, 16-18; see also Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356-357 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing supply
and demand concerns as one reason not to require that employers equally reward jobs that command
similar skills but different market prices); M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 75-77
(1983) (discussing Christensen).
115. M. GOLD, supra note 114, at 55-64.
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producers from abroad.' 16 Alternatively, if employers responded to the
higher costs of female employees by substituting foreign workers or less
labor-intensive processes, the result would be increased domestic unem-
ployment.11 7 The greater the government's involvement in the wage-set-
ting process, the greater critics' concerns about overtures to a centrally
planned economy.""
Critics have also questioned whether these costs would be offset by
gains in social justice. One concern is that higher wages might simply
encourage women to stay in traditional, female-dominated jobs, and thus
reinforce the problems of occupational crowding and stereotyping that
underlie current sex-based disparities. 119 Moreover, according to some
commentators, comparable worth as a distributive principle would often
prove regressive. The primary beneficiaries would be middle-class white
women, and the primary losers would be lower-class minority men. A
familiar claim has been that the "maintenance man will be paid less so
the librarian can be paid more."' 120
Both the magnitude and distribution of such adverse consequences
are open to question, however. Estimates of the aggregate price of com-
parable worth have ranged between 2 and 150 billion dollars, and projec-
tions of efficiency and GNP losses reflect similar variations.' 21 On the
whole, available research suggests that critics have often overestimated
the costs and underestimated the potential benefits of pay equity. 122 Ob-
116. See generally sources cited supra note 114, infra note 117.
117. See Fischel & Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 891, 907 (1986) (discussing unemployment as a possible consequence of wage adjustments);
cf American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing inefficiencies
associated with comparable worth). But see Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor
Market and the Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
934, 947 (1986) (suggesting that movement of males into higher-paying women's jobs would create
new employment opportunities for women in male jobs).
118. See Jacobson, Comparable Worth: The Working Woman's Issue for the 80s, NAT'L F., fall
1981, at 5, 5; Levin, supra note 114, at 18-19; Reynolds, Comparable Worth: Bad Policy and Bad
Law, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 90, 94 (1986).
119. 1 COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 12, at 111 (statement of June O'Neill); Nelson, Opton
& Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH.
J.L, REF. 233 (1980); Ratner, Equal Employment for Women: Summary of Themes and Issues, in
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN 419, 432-33 (R. Ratner ed. 1980).
120. Scales-Trent, Comparable Worth: Is This a Theory for Black Workers?, 8 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 51, 56 (1984) (quoting Michael Horowitz, Counsel to Director of Office of Management and
Budget); see also NATIONAL COMM'N ON PAY EQUITY, supra note 3, at 16-18 (discussing impact of
pay equity initiatives on minority men).
121. Newman & Vonhof, "Separate but Equal"-Job Segregation and Pay Equity in the Wake of
Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 309; Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political
Realities: Concluding Remarks, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note
59, at 285, 290-93.
122. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text; see also Brown, Baumann & Melnick, Equal
Pay for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of the Rhetoric, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 127,
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jections concerning unemployment, inflation, foreign competition, and
socialism have been voiced about virtually every form of employment
regulation over the last century. Such concerns were common in early
debates surrounding child labor, occupational safety, minimum wage,
and collective bargaining regulation. 123 Mucking about with the free
market earlier in this century did not lead to chaos or communism then,
and it is unlikely to do so now.
Criticisms of the subjectivity of comparable worth procedures tend
to ignore the biases of existing wage structures. Current pay differentials
reflect a legacy of discrimination that already distorts responses to labor
supply and demand. 124 Subjectivity is what we now have; the fact that it
is embedded in existing market dynamics does not render it morally just
or economically essential. Critics' adverse projections have also incorpo-
rated assumptions about the efficiency and competitiveness of current
markets, assumptions that do not hold in many public and private sec-
tors of the economy where pay equity initiatives have centered.12 5 Grad-
ual pay scale revisions in these areas could in turn help drive up women's
compensation in other contexts.
Although comprehensive long-term data are lacking, the compara-
ble worth reforms here and abroad have not appeared to trigger the kinds
of inflation, inefficiency, and unemployment that critics predict. The typ-
ical cost of these reforms has been around five to ten percent of employ-
ers' total wage rates, phased in over a number of years. 126 Recent case
studies of state and local comparable worth initiatives have not found
evidence of increased unemployment or reduced interest in non-tradi-
tional jobs among female workers. 127 Moreover, even if the immediate
169-70 (1986) (arguing that judicial critics of comparable worth have too readily accepted predic-
tions of disruptive economic results); Hartmann, Comparable Worth and Women's Economic Inde-
pendence, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 253-57 (discussing economy's ability to adjust
to modest cost increases that typically result from comparable worth).
123. See generally Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Conclud-
ing Remarks, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 59, at 285, 289-93
(responding to economic criticisms of comparable worth).
124. See the discussion of sex-role socialization and discriminatory practices, supra text accom-
panying notes 25-40.
125. For example, even the most ardent critics of comparable worth, such as Richard Posner,
have acknowledged that "collective bargaining, public regulation of wages and hours, and the lack of
information and mobility of some workers may make the market model an inaccurate description of
how relative wages are determined and how they influence the choice of jobs," particularly in the
context of the state as employer. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir.
1986).
126. Hartmann, Comparable Worth and Women's Economic Independence, in EMPLOYMENT
POLICY, supra note 5, at 256.
127. See, e.g., Clauss, supra note 104, at 90-95 (reviewing studies); Rothchild, Pay Equity-The
Minnesota Experience, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 209, 214-15 (1986) (describing Minnesota's experience
with pay equity at the state and local levels).
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effect of increasing pay in some female-dominated job contexts were to
reduce the number of positions available, the eventual result might be to
encourage women's entrance into alternative, male-dominated occupa-
tions. That, in turn, could reduce occupational segregation and gender
disparities in reward structures. 128 Any adequate analysis of comparable
worth must take into account not only its short-term costs, but also its
long-term benefits.
Such an analysis must also remain sensitive to the distribution of
those costs and benefits. Contrary to critics' suggestions, recent evidence
does not establish that comparable worth reforms have imposed dispro-
portionate burdens on minority or blue-collar workers. 129 Women of
color are overrepresented in public-sector, female-dominated occupa-
tions, where such reforms have been most pervasive. 130 Minority male
workers are similarly overrepresented in female-dominated jobs that have
benefited most from pay equity initiatives. 131 Moreover, the same proce-
dures that have exposed evidence of gender bias have often revealed evi-
dence of racial bias as well, and the resulting adjustments have benefited
groups that are disadvantaged on both counts.132 Although evidence re-
garding class is more mixed, some research has suggested that overcom-
pensation is most likely with male-dominated white-collar, not blue-
collar, jobs. 133 Whatever short-term losses some workers sustain as a
result of job revaluations must also be offset by the potential long-term
gains of making compensation criteria explicit and subjecting such crite-
ria to collective bargaining and organizing strategies.
C. Pay Equity Implementation.
Much of the objection to pay equity could be minimized if imple-
mentation occurred gradually, with some sensitivity to the costs of pay
equity and to the respective abilities of various decisionmakers. It is well
within courts' capabilities and authority to enforce principles of relative
worth and to hold employers accountable for salary discrimination that
128. Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Remarks, in
COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 59, at 285, 290-91; see Holzhauer,
The Economic Possibilities of Comparable Worth, 53 U. CH. L. REv. 919, 928 n.16 (1986).
129. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON PAY EQUITY, supra note 3, at 17-18, 63-64, 105-06; Clauss,
supra note 104, at 93-95.
130. See Malveaux, Comparable Worth and Its Impact on Black Women, in SLIPPING THROUGH
THE CRACKS, supra note 11, at 53-61; see also COMPARABLE WORTH, PAY EQUITY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 157-236 (R. Kelly & J. Bayes eds. 1988) (reviewing implementation of comparable worth in
the public sector).
131. NATIONAL COMM'N ON PAY EQUITY, supra note 3, at 82, 105.
132. See id. at 105, 177-78; Malveaux, Comparable Worth and Its Impact on Black Women, in
SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS, supra note 11, at 56.
133. See Bartholet, supra note 86, at 1004-05; Clauss, supra note 104, at 93-94.
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employers cannot justify under their own evaluative criteria. However,
issues of intrinsic worth-that is, judgments about what criteria are most
important and how those judgments should be made-are best addressed
through political and collective bargaining processes. Such an allocation
of responsibility could do much to clarify existing law.
1. Judicial Strategies. Part of the confusion stems from the
United States Supreme Court's determination to avoid decisions on
point. In the first decade and a half of pay equity litigation, the Court
accepted review of only one case, County of Washington v. Gunther. 134
In Gunther, a majority of Justices carefully disclaimed any view on the
"controversial concept of 'comparable worth.' "135 In fact, the case in-
volved a straightforward application of relative worth principles. The
plaintiffs, female jail guards, alleged that county officials had intention-
ally discriminated on the basis of sex by setting female guards' pay scales
below those of male guards and below what county surveys indicated was
appropriate. In concluding that such allegations stated a claim under
title VII's antidiscrimination mandates, the majority noted that its hold-
ing would not force a court to make "its own subjective assessment of the
value of the male and female guard jobs" or to quantify the impact of
discrimination. 136 Rather, the plaintiffs were seeking remedies for a de-
parture from their employer's own evaluation of relative worth. 137
In the aftermath of Gunther, lower-court decisionmaking has re-
mained confusing and confused. In contexts analogous to Gunther, some
judges have rejected relative worth claims on the dubious assumption
that they would open a "Pandora's box" and potentially disrupt "the
entire economic system of the United States of America." 138 Similar
concerns were apparent in a celebrated federal court decision involving
Washington state employees. 139 The litigation arose in the mid-1970s af-
ter the state's own survey found that women's jobs paid an average of
twenty percent less than men's jobs with comparable rankings. Despite
that finding, the state did not seek to reduce the disparity until six years
later, after the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) filed a sex discrimination suit. In the federal trial
134. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
135. Id. at 166.
136. Id. at 181.
137. Id. at 166.
138. Lemons v. City of Denver, 17 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 906, 909, 907 (D. Colo. 1978);
see American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986); Christensen v. Iowa, 563
F.2d 353, 355-56 (8th Cir. 1977).
139. AFSCME v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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judge's view, such inaction (coupled with other evidence of gender bias)
constituted proof of intentional disparate treatment in violation of title
VII. 40 The district court further concluded that the state's salary prac-
tices had a disparate impact on predominantly female job classifications,
and that no business necessity could justify those practices. Accordingly,
the district judge's decree ordered the state to raise female wages and
provide back pay of some 838 million dollars. 14' Since estimates of the
total costs of compliance ran as high as a billion dollars, the case aroused
considerable public attention.142
Its notoriety was short-lived. In 1985, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision.143
Under the appellate panel's analysis in AFSCME v. Washington, com-
pensation schemes based on market forces did not constitute specific em-
ployment practices for purposes of establishing disparate impact. Nor
was the state's reliance on market wage rates rather than job evaluation
surveys sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. 144 Underlying the
court's judgment were concerns both about the indeterminacy of job
evaluation and the likelihood that few employers would undertake it if
title VII liability could follow. Before further appeals, the parties
reached a settlement under which the state allocated 480 million dollars
over six years to raise salaries in female-dominated occupations.145
Yet, it is possible to address the concerns of the appellate court in
AFSCME without denying legal remedies in all comparable worth con-
texts. Where decisionmakers have commissioned an evaluation and ac-
cepted its results, the accuracy of survey procedures need not become an
issue. If holding employers to the results of their own job reassessments
discourages these initiatives, federal, state, or local governments could
mandate such evaluations, either directly or as a condition of receiving
government contracts or assistance. Courts also could minimize disin-
centives for comparable worth reviews by following precedents from
other sex discrimination contexts and by considering such reviews as evi-
dence of gender bias only for purposes of granting prospective relief, not
back pay. ' 46 In addition, employers' refusal to undertake evaluation pro-
cedures could serve as a basis for liability, at least under circumstances
140. Id. at 867.
141. Id. at 871.
142. See Weiler, supra note 109, at 1750 & nn.90-91.
143. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
144. Id. at 1405-06.
145. See Weiler, supra note 109, at 1755.
146. For sex discrimination decisions granting only prospective remedies, see Arizona Gov-
erning Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435
U.s. 702 (1978).
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suggesting a violation of relative worth principles. Where employers re-
ceive evidence indicating that the same characteristics command higher
pay in predominantly male jobs than in predominantly female jobs, a
refusal to take corrective measures could serve as grounds for legal
intervention.
This approach would have the advantage of providing some re-
course for demonstrable gender or racial bias in relative wage rates, but
would not enmesh courts in disputes over intrinsic value. Such a strategy
would allow employers to consider market factors in establishing job
evaluation criteria, but would not allow employers to depart from those
criteria simply because they could hire female or minority employees for
less. To recognize market forces as a complete defense in wage discrimi-
nation cases is to perpetuate the problems antidiscrimination law was
designed to address. Just as we do not tolerate such excuses in other
equal pay or in title VII contexts, we should not tolerate them here. 147
This framework would also respond to legitimate concerns about
judicial capacity and the lack of principled standards for resoling issues
of intrinsic worth. If, for example, employers commission job evaluation
surveys that attach high importance to skills that are disproportionately
associated with male-dominated positions (for example, heavy lifting), on
what grounds would courts challenge those assessments? Judges would
have to adjudicate battles among experts, with very little basis on which
to choose between them. Although such battles would not be unique to
comparable worth litigation, the implications of staging them under judi-
cial oversight raise significant concerns. Indeterminate standards often
result in substantial uncertainties, inconsistencies, and legal costs.
Of still greater concern are the potential economic dislocations that
litigation over intrinsic worth could entail. If courts were to require that
evaluation systems focus only on job content, how could variations in
labor supply be accommodated? As litigation in the early 1980s indi-
cated, examples such as academics with differential pay scales present
more than hypothetical problems. 148 Had courts in those cases required
that compensation reflect only intrinsic job characteristics, with no al-
lowance for wage differentials sensitive to market factors, universities
would have faced an unhappy choice. In the likely event that budget
147. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 49, at 82-90; Clauss, supra note 104, at 77-
83.
148. See Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 706 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1984); Craik v.
Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 480 (8th Cir. 1984); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654
F.2d 388, 402 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally Hildebrand, The Market System, in ISSUES AND AL-
TERNATIVES, supra note 110, at 79-106 (discussing significance of external labor markets in setting
salaries).
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constraints would have prevented raising all salaries, administrators
would have been forced to reduce compensation for faculty in male-dom-
inated, high-paying disciplines such as law and medicine, and accept
whatever loss in quality or quantity of instructors resulted. While the
world might well be better off with fewer law professors, it is by no
means clear that we want courts to make that determination.
2. Political Strategies. The above objections do not, however, ap-
ply with equal force to pay equity strategies in collective bargaining and
legislative contexts. These forums have the advantage of allowing wider
participation and more flexible implementation than is generally possible
in litigation. Pay equity as a political issue presents opportunities not
only to challenge workplace values, but also to expand the groups in-
volved in workplace decisionmaking. As contemporary union campaigns
reflect, comparable worth can also be a powerful mobilizing force among
women. 149 One significant contributor to wage disparities between the
sexes has been a lack of organization among female employees. In the
mid-1980s, female workers were only half as likely as men to belong to
unions, and unionized women earned, on the average, twenty percent
more than non-unionized women. 150 Comparable disparities exist for
minorities, and unions historically have paid too little attention to the
interests of these groups. 151 Pay equity presents new opportunities. By
raising the expectations, self-esteem, and sense of relative deprivation
among women and minorities, comparable worth initiatives can aid
workplace organizing and bargaining efforts.
Pay equity might also perform similar functions in political cam-
paigns at the national, state, and local levels. Comparable worth
frameworks can challenge not only the undervaluation of women's work,
but also women's underrepresentation in evaluation processes. One ob-
jective of these frameworks could be to vest greater responsibility for job
reassessment in committees or task forces with broad-based worker and
management representation. The more inclusive the evaluative process,
the less likely that it will reflect gender, racial, and class biases.' 52
149. See Drogin, Comparable Worth at Center of Yale Strike, L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 1984, § 1, at
5, col. 1.
150. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
210 (1985); see Weiler, supra note 109, at 1797-801.
151. See Kessler-Harris, Where Are the Organized Women Workers?, in A HERITAGE OF HER
OWN 343-66 (N. Cott & E. Pleck eds. 1979); Weiler, supra note 109, at 1797-801. See generally J.
KENNEALLY, WOMEN AND AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS (1981) (discussing barriers to organizing
women).
152. See Acker, Sex Bias in Job Evaluation: A Comparable Worth Issue, in EMPLOYMENT POL-
ICY, supra note 5, at 186-96 (discussing Oregon Comparable Worth Task Force); Bielby & Baron,
Undoing Discrimination: Job Integration and Comparable Worth, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra
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All too often, both critics and supporters have treated comparable
worth as a generic concept, without regard to variations in evaluation
strategies and decisionmaking contexts. In many debates, pay equity ap-
pears as the first step on the path either to socialism or to salvation.
Critics, including some prominent executive branch officials, frequently
present comparable worth as ludicrous or dangerous; it becomes either
the" 'looniest' idea since 'Looney Tunes,'" or a serious overture towards
a centrally planned economy. 153 To proponents, it is these criticisms that
border on the fanciful.
A more productive dialogue requires less loose rhetoric and more
contextual analysis, sensitive to the varying implications of legal, legisla-
tive, and bargaining strategies. Enough public- and private-sector initia-
tives are now in place to allow more comprehensive review of different
job reevaluation procedures and their effects on unemployment, inflation,
turnover, occupational segregation, worker satisfaction, and income dis-
tribution. Where adverse consequences of comparable worth have
emerged, we need further analysis of policies that might best cushion
such effects, such as job retraining, affirmative action, and expanded un-
employment compensation. Our research agenda should also explore
broader questions surrounding markets, merit, and money. How much
consensus is there concerning the relative importance of factors that in-
fluence compensation? How closely do public attitudes about what sala-
ries should be correspond to what salaries actually are? What evaluation
procedures are most likely to seem fair to the greatest number of
constituencies?
As with affirmative action, the most substantial risks of comparable
worth are not the ones that conservatives invoke. The danger is less that
it will prove too radical than that it will not prove radical enough. One
disquieting possibility is that some narrow vision of pay equity will pre-
vail, and that concerns about gender will displace concerns about race,
class, and ethnicity. If we rest with narrow, incremental reform strate-
gies, the result could be a modified compensation hierarchy under which
the haves still come out far ahead, but with more women among them.
A related concern is that short-term political objectives could obscure
broader normative issues. By cloaking job evaluation with a mantle of
note 5, at 226 (advocating worker representation in setting compensation policy); Reskin, Bringing
the Men Back in: Sex Differentiation and the Devaluation of Women's Work 2 GENDER & SOC'Y 58,
74-75 (1988) (discussing need for women to apply political pressure to secure pay equity).
153. Lawson, Women in State Jobs Gain in Pay Equity, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1985, at C12, col. 2
(quoting Civil Rights Commission Chairman Clarence Pendleton, Jr.); see also Weiler, supra note
109, at 1729 (quoting Ronald Reagan dismissing concept of comparable worth as a "cockamamie
idea"); see Levin, supra note 118, at 16-19; Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilites and Political
Realities, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 59, at 289-90.
1239Vol. 1988:1207]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
"scientific" objectivity, comparable worth adjustments could insulate
wage hierarchies from more searching review.
A more hopeful alternative is that pay equity initiatives will focus
attention on fundamental questions not only of gender equality but of
social priorities. How should we reward various occupational and
worker attributes, and how much differentiation across salary levels is
appropriate? Are we comfortable with a society that pays more for park-
ing attendants than for child care attendants, whatever the male/female
composition of these jobs? Exploring the dynamics of comparable worth
can enrich our understanding of gender and class inequities, and of the
strategies best able to reduce them. Inspired by a social vision that em-
phasizes collective responsibility rather than individual competition, job
revaluation could become a strategy for narrowing economic inequality.
From that vantage, comparable worth is indeed a radical concept, but
not in the sense most critics claim. It need not invite the kind of central-
ized planning reflected in current state-run economies, which have
scarcely dispensed with wage hierarchies or ensured gender equality.
Rather, pay equity initiatives could help spark a rethinking of the scope
of inequality and the ideologies that sustain it.
III. EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
If occupational equity is to become a serious national commitment,
expressed in social policy as well as in political rhetoric, we need an array
of strategies that extend beyond antidiscrimination and pay equity man-
dates. Women's subordinate labor force status is a function of various
factors, including sex-role socialization, workplace structures, and do-
mestic constraints. Effective policy responses will require an equally va-
ried set of public- and private-sector initiatives, and a more systematic
attempt to assess the relative success of these initiatives.
Although law has a limited influence on socialization processes, it
could play a more constructive role. Government-funded education,
counseling, vocational, and job training programs often affect occupa-
tional choices. Yet despite formal mandates of gender equality, such pro-
grams have often served more to perpetuate than to counteract sex-role
stereotypes. Vocational education remains highly gender-segregated, as
do placements under government-sponsored job-training programs. 154
Efforts to improve women's math and science skills and to interest men
in traditional female vocations have been at best sporadic. Too few finan-
cial incentives have been available to private employers for programs that
challenge occupational segregation through recruitment, training, coun-
154. See WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra note 29, at 108-110.
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seling, and restructured promotion ladders that bridge male- and female-
dominated job sectors. All of these areas require greater governmental
resources and more systematic study.155
Similar observations are applicable to other workplace structures.
More incentives should be available for employers to offer part-time and
flexible schedules. Adequate parental leaves and child care should be-
come social priorities. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, em-
ployment-related issues must be conceived as part of a broader political
agenda. Men's and women's positions in the market are affected by a
wide network of public policies concerning education, housing, welfare,
tax structure, and social services. Too many of these policies reflect out-
moded assumptions about women's secondary labor force status; too few
address the structural problems that still confine many women to that
status. For almost a century, some feminists have sought programs
designed better to accommodate public and private life: cooperative resi-
dential housing, child care and homemaker services, and integrated ur-
ban planning sensitive to the needs of single parents and dual-career
couples. Current demographic trends have invested such policies with
new urgency, not only to promote gender equality in this generation, but
to provide decent environments for the next.
155. See id. at 99-112.
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